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We consider a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information
where strategic delegation is available to the regulator. Firms can sink non-
contractible, cost-reducing investment but regulators cannot commit to future
price levels. We fully characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and show
that, with incentive contracts and no delegation, under-investment occurs. We
then show that delegation to a suitable regulator can both improve investment
incentives and ameliorate the ratchet e®ect by credibly o®ering the ¯rm future
rent. Simulations indicate signi¯cant welfare gains from these two e®ects and
that a wide range of regulatory preferences can achieve this result.
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In many settings, an investment `hold-up' problem can arise because one party is unable
to commit to appropriate action once the other has sunk the investment costs. A famil-
iar example occurs in the context of industry price regulation because regulators face
a con°ict between their desire to encourage investment and their obligations towards
consumers. The weak incentives implicit in such arrangements have been blamed for
poor investment performance in several regulatory environments (e.g. Levy and Spiller
(1994); Lyon (1995); Newbery (1999)).
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the under-investment problem in the con-
text of a dynamic non-commitment relationship between a regulator and a regulated
monopoly. We assume that the regulator observes neither the ¯rm's productivity nor
whether investment has taken place, but can observe the ¯rm's total costs (though
not the individual components of cost). The presence of asymmetric information
means that the welfare costs of suboptimal investment are compounded by those of
the ratchet e®ect that typically a²icts such dynamic non-commitment problems. The
paper makes two contributions. First, it proposes (and demonstrates) a solution to the
under-investment problem based on strategic delegation to an independent regulator
with suitable preferences. We suggest that commitment to such `types' often occurs in
practice. Second, this takes place in a model that extends the theoretical literature on
regulation in two ways: (i) situations where the regulator observes neither investment
nor the other components of cost have received little attention yet, for some types of
activity, are clearly appropriate; (ii) we examine the problem in the context of optimal
(subject to asymmetric information) price regulation, where the regulator is prevented
from making lump-sum transfers to the ¯rm. Again, this re°ects much regulatory
practice.
A number of authors have considered the under-investment problem. The literature
can be usefully divided into papers that develop `reputational' trigger-strategy equilib-
ria where strategies are history-dependent, and those that focus on sequential or perfect
Bayesian or subgame-perfect equilibria (depending on the information assumptions)
1without history-dependence.1 Considering the former ¯rst, in a complete information
dynamic game between the utility and a benevolent regulator, Salant and Woroch
(1992) and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) show that ¯rst-best levels of investment can
be sustained as a subgame-perfect trigger-strategy equilibrium. Unfortunately, there
are well-known problems with this approach concerning the arbitrary length of the
punishment phase (usually in¯nity) and the in¯nite number of such equilibria. Even
if coordination is possible, the equilibrium is not `renegotiation-proof'. This questions
the credibility of trigger-strategy equilibria, even though they are subgame perfect.2
Turning to the second group of papers, Goodwin and Patrick (1992) focus on the
speed with which regulators should allow sunk cost recovery. Alternatively, Lyon (1995)
uses a full information model to show how allowing the regulator to engage in hindsight
review can prevent investment with uncertain costs. Lewis and Sappington (1991) con-
sider the e®ects on investment of changing regulators when investment cost is uncertain
but is guaranteed to be reimbursed to the ¯rm. On average, under-investment occurs.
Besanko and Spulber (1992) assume that the regulator cannot observe the ¯rm's cost
and cannot commit to a particular price level: she must o®er a transfer and price once
investment has been observed. In their sequential equilibrium, the ¯rm can signal its
type through this observable investment and the under-investment problem is amelio-
rated; see also Urbiztondo (1994). Dalen (1995) looks at a two-period model in which
investment takes place in period 1. The regulator cannot observe ¯rms' costs and again
provides transfers to the ¯rm. When investment is contractible, it reduces the ratchet
e®ect by inducing more ¯rst-period separation. When investment is non-contractible,
1There is a literature that restricts the set of allowable equilibria to those for which both parties (in
our context, the regulator and the ¯rm) agree in each period. These `renegotiation-proof' contracts
are binding unless both players agree to replace the original contract. They assume an intermediate
degree of commitment between the `full' and the `no' intertemporal commitment to policy scenarios
studied in this paper. Our delegation game, set out in section 4, assumes that the regulator cannot
commit, either fully or partially, to pricing policy, but in appointing the regulator the government
can commit to a particular type. See La®ont and Tirole (1993), chapter 10, for details of two-period
renegotiation-proof price contracts, but without investment.
2See al Nowaihi and Levine (1994) who, in the context of a monetary policy game, argue for a re¯ne-
ment they term `chisel-proofness' to resolve this di±culty. It should be noted that the renegotiation-
proof equilibria used in repeated games di®er from the concept used in the contract literature discussed
in the previous footnote. They do not necessarily involve contracts or even negotiation, but should
be interpreted as allowing players to recoordinate their expectations of strategies. For this reason the
term `recoordination-proof' equilibria is often used instead. For further discussion see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1993), section 5.4.
2under-investment occurs.3
As explained above, we amend this literature by considering a long-term regulatory
relationship with non-contractible investment, asymmetric information about costs and
no lump-sum transfers. Speci¯cally, we build on La®ont and Tirole (1993)'s framework.
Firms can be e±cient or ine±cient and can take (costly) action to reduce their costs
in each of two periods. In the ¯rst, they can also undertake costly activity to lower
their costs in future (`investment'). The regulator observes none of these three actions
but observes total costs and must design prices to encourage cost-reducing e®ort and
investment, as well as generating consumer surplus. Being unable to commit to future
prices means that sub-optimal investment and the ratchet e®ect occur. We characterise
the full range of perfect Bayesian equilibria for this setting, which can involve complete
separation as well as partial and complete pooling.
Our set-up explores a particular solution to the sub-optimal investment problem,
and the ratchet e®ect: strategic delegation to an independent regulator with pro-
industry preferences.4 The intuition is that a regulator's preference for industry pro¯ts
dilutes the commitment problem she faces. In the current paper, the e®ects of this
idea are particularly strong because the ¯rm's awareness of the regulator's pro-industry
tastes makes it more con¯dent of retaining pro¯ts from cost-reducing investment and
avoiding the ratchet e®ect of early information revelation. Interestingly, delegation
can produce, over-investment as well as under-investment. However, delegation to
particular (identi¯able) types of regulator generates optimal investment. We present
simulations to illustrate potentially signi¯cant welfare gains from such delegation.5
3A related literature, beginning with Averch and Johnson (1967) compares investment incentives
under alternative forms of price regulation, typically rate-of-return and price-capping. In a recent
contribution, allowing for complete information and technical progress, Biglaiser and Riordan (2000)
demonstrate that sub-optimal investment may be generated by both these schemes: with rate-of-return
regulation this happens because of the treatment of depreciation in the face of technical progress; with
price-capping it results from the commitment problems associated with regulatory reviews.
4Baron and Besanko (1987) consider an alternative mechanism for avoiding the ratchet e®ect.
They assume that the regulator is committed (by some means) to choose from `fair' mechanisms
(those which respect the ¯rm's zero pro¯t constraint) and, in exchange, the ¯rm by choosing to
participate in the ¯rst period, waives its right not to participate in the second period. Their set-up
therefore assumes some degree of commitment by both the regulator and the ¯rm, whereas we assume
commitment only by the government (to a regulatory `type'). In addition, the problem they address
di®ers fundamentally from ours by excluding investment and moral hazard.
5The literature identi¯es several kinds of strategic delegation. In particular, apart from delegation
to a (publicly observable) `type' of regulator (Baron (1988), Spulber and Besanko (1992), Currie
3We argue that this solution is appealing because of its correspondence with practice
in several economies: for example, utilities regulation in the UK and certain features
of environmental regulation in the US. One of the arguments for regulation over public
ownership has been the independence this injects into the oversight of the industries
concerned (Armstrong et al. (1994)) and it is certainly the case that British regulators
are contractually independent from considerable government interference.6 Further, it
is clear that di®erent `types' of regulator are available to a government and that these
types are observable before appointment (for example, from the candidate's track-
record).7 Thus, it seems that a government can commit to a particular type of regulator
more easily than to a particular policy. This point has also been made by Spulber and
Besanko (1992) in the context of US environmental regulation and by Rogo® (1985) in
the context of monetary policy.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we set out the basic model
and derive a full information benchmark: the Ramsey-optimum prices and investment
levels. Section 3 then looks at price regulation with asymmetric information and com-
mitment to two-period contracts, in order to explain the `time-inconsistency' problem
caused by non-commitment. In section 4, we relax the commitment assumption and,
instead, introduce the idea of strategic delegation to a regulator whose `type' is ob-
servable ex ante. We characterise the full set of equilibria for this model and illustrate
them by simulation. Of particular interest here is the potential increases in investment
and Pareto improvements in welfare that come about through delegation and the wide
range of regulator types capable of achieving this outcome. The ¯nal section o®ers
et al. (1999)) one might consider delegation to a given regulator whose actions are then governed
by an incentive contract or set of instructions which may (or may not) be publicly observable|see
Fershtman et al. (1991), Fershtman and Kalai (1997) and Fershtman and Gneezy (2001). Analogously,
literature on central banking also distinguishes these two kinds of strategic delegation: c.f. Rogo®
(1985) and Walsh (1995). The key ingredient is that observable commitment (to a type, a contract,
an instruction or to the use of delegation) can improve welfare from the delegator's perspective.
6For example: \...the [BT regulator] is o±cially independent of ministerial control and ...isnot
due for reappointment for another three years" (Financial Times, 22/9/00, p. 1). See Graham (2000)
for an account of the constitutional status of utility regulators in the UK.
7Again, examples are available in the UK. Thus, Tom Winsor's appointment as UK rail regulator
in 1999 was regarded as a \hawkish" move amongst commentators because of his strong track record
in consumer law (e.g. Daily Telegraph, 24/3/99; 28/5/99). We do not consider the mechanisms
available for choosing such regulators (see Baron (1988), Spulber and Besanko (1992), for examples
of how the political process might do this). Instead, our aim is to illustrate the gains available from
such delegation in the current context.
4conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2 Full Information and the Ramsey Optimum
2.1 The Model and Payo®s
First, we set out the basic elements of the model. There are two periods. In period
t =1 ;2, the ¯rm produces a quantity qt of a homogeneous good at cost
Ct = ¯t ¡ et + cqt; ¯1 = ¯ + i; ¯2 = ¯ ¡ f(i) (1)
where et is total cost-reducing e®ort of which an amount i, `investment', is devoted to
reducing ¯xed costs in the second period by an amount f(i).8 Marginal costs are ¯xed
and given by c. We make the standard assumptions f0 > 0;f00 < 0, f( 0 )=0 ;f0(0) =
¡1. We also assume that the e±ciency parameter is su±ciently large to ensure that
¯xed costs are never negative; i.e., ¯t ¡ et ¸ 0. The good is sold at a price pt = Á(qt)
where Á(¢) is the inverse demand curve.
Both the ¯rm and regulator maximize a two-period welfare function with the same
discount factor ± and with single-period payo®s given respectively by
U(qt;e t;¯ t)=R(qt) ¡ Ct ¡ Ã(et)
= R(qt) ¡ cqt ¡ ¯t + et ¡ Ã(et) (2)
W(qt;e t;¯ t;®)=S(qt) ¡ R(qt)+®Ut
= S(qt) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)R(qt) ¡ ®[cqt +( ¯t ¡ et + Ã(et))] (3)
In (2), Ã(et) is the disutility of e®ort and again we make standard assumptions:
Ã0;Ã 00 > 0 for et > 0;Ã (et) = 0 otherwise. In (3), S(qt) is the gross consumer
surplus of the industry, R(qt)=ptqt is the revenue, S(qt) ¡ R(qt) is the net consumer
surplus and the weight ® is placed on the ¯rm's pro¯t by the regulator. A utilitarian
8The assumption that e®ort only reduces ¯xed and not variable costs can be relaxed but a consider-
able cost in terms of tractability. For example, we could assume two types of imperfectly substitutable
e®ort with managers dividing their total e®ort in each period between reducing ¯xed and variable costs.
La®ont and Tirole (1993) consider situations where all e®ort is devoted to reducing variable costs.
5regulator would have ® = 1, but in this paper we examine the e®ect of delegating to a
regulator chosen to have di®erent preferences. Suppose that the government has pref-
erences de¯ned by ® = ®s · 1. Then a choice ®>® s signi¯es a more `pro-industry'
(pro-rent) regulator type than the government, while ®<® s would signify a more
`pro-consumer' type.
2.2 The Ramsey Optimum (RO)
We ¯rst solve for the `Ramsey Optimum' (RO); that is the social optimum subject
to a two-period individual rationality constraint for the ¯rm.9 This provides a full
information benchmark for later results. Suppose that the social planner adopts the
single-period social welfare function (3) with weight ® = ®s. Then the RO is found
by the maximization of the intertemporal social welfare function ­ = W1 + ±W2 with
respect to (qt, et), t =1 ;2 and i, where Wt is given by (3) with weight ® = ®s, subject
to a two-period individual rationality constraint
IR : U1 + ±U2 ¸ 0
To solve this maximization problem de¯ne a Lagrangian L =­+¹(U1 + ±U1)
where ¹ is a Lagrangian multiplier. The Kuhn-Tucker ¯rst-order and complementary
slackness (CS) conditions are
et : Ã
0(et)=1 ; t =1 ;2 (4)
i : ±f
0(i) = 1 (5)
qt : S
0(qt)+( ®s ¡ 1+¹)R
0(qt)=( ®s + ¹)c; t =1 ;2 (6)
CS : ¹(U1 + ±U2)=0
9We use the term `Ramsey-Optimal' because the pricing formula involves a (Ramsey) inverse
elasticity mark-up to cover ¯xed costs. Notice that the unconstrained social optimum would have
pt = c and would require investment to be subsidized.





¹ + ®s ¡ 1
(¹ + ®s)´(qt)
(7)
where Lt is the Lerner index and ´(qt)=¡ptq0
t=qt is the elasticity of demand. It follows
from (7) that the price in each period is the same. Furthermore, since ¯xed costs can
never be negative by assumption, this common price must exceed the marginal cost,
otherwise the IR constraint cannot be satis¯ed; thus Lt > 0. It follows from (7) that







; t =1 ;2
Clearly this condition holds if ®s · 1, which we presently assume.
From (7) Ramsey prices p1 = p2 = pRO and hence output q1 = q2 = qRO are equal in
the two periods, but not yet determined. Denote by eRO and iRO the Ramsey-optimal
levels of e and i given by (4) and (5) respectively. Substituting back into the binding
IR constraint then determines the Ramsey-optimal output qRO and hence the price
pRO = Á(qRO), completing the social planner's problem.10
3 Asymmetric Information with Commitment
We now seek to establish the nature of the commitment problem in our model. First,
we present results for the case where commitment is feasible, then we explain how these
break down when the regulator cannot commit to a contract with the ¯rm.
In contrast with the previous section, suppose that neither e®ort nor the produc-
tivity parameter ¯ are observed by the regulator so she faces both an adverse selection
and moral hazard problem. The regulator observes total cost and knows that ¯ belongs
to a two-point support: ¯ = ¯ and ¯ = ¯ (¯>¯> 0), over which she holds priors º1
10With commitment plus full information about total costs and demand, the RO can be implemented
if the regulator faces only a moral hazard (¯ but not e or i observable) or an adverse selection (e and
i but not ¯ observable). In the former case, she commits to a two-period contract specifying only pRO
and rent maximizing managers choose eRO and iRO. In the latter case, the regulator can calculate ¯
from observable cost, demand, e®ort and investment.
7and 1 ¡ º1 respectively at the beginning of period 1. Investment does not need to be
contractible, nor indeed observable for our results to hold.
Following La®ont and Tirole (1993), the regulator must now design contracts (p
t;Ct),
(pt;Ct);t=1 ;2 for the e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms respectively. In doing so, she must
recognise the incentive compatibility constraints introduced by asymmetric informa-
tion: each ¯rm can mimic the other's costs by suitable choice of unobservable e®ort.
Letting pC
1 = pC
2 = pC, pC
1 = pC
2 = pC, etc., denote the solution to this problem is11
Proposition 1 (Commitment Equilibrium). Assume ® = ®s · 1 and ¯xed costs
are always positive. Then for the two-period contract under commitment we have that:
(i) eC = eRO; eC <e RO.
(ii) iC = i
C = iRO.
(iii) If the elasticity ´(qt) is non-increasing in qt, pC >p C.
(iv) For both types of ¯rm, rent is less in the ¯rst period than the second. For the
ine±cient ¯rm, rent is negative in the ¯rst period and positive in the second.
Parts (i) and (iii) of this proposition re°ect the single-period trade-o® between
e®ort and rent that typi¯es such incentive contracts (see La®ont and Tirole (1993)).
However, (ii) tells us that the regulator's ability to commit assures the ¯rm of su±cient
second-period rent (see (iv)) to encourage Ramsey-optimal investment.
Having examined the nature of the commitment solution in the presence of asym-
metric information, now suppose that such commitment is not feasible. In this case, the
contracts described in Proposition 1 are time-inconsistent: although they are optimal
ex ante, ex post in period 2 they cease to be optimal and there exists a temptation for
the regulator to re-optimize. This temptation exists for two reasons. First, the contract
is a revelation mechanism that reveals the type of ¯rm. In the second period an opti-
mizing regulator will o®er a new contract at a lower price that removes any information
rent to the e±cient ¯rm. This is the familiar `ratchet e®ect' which, when anticipated
by the e±cient ¯rm, requires higher information rent in the ¯rst period to satisfy the
¯rst-period incentive-compatibility constraint. Second, the ¯rst-period investment is a
11See Levine and Rickman (2001) for a proof of the case where investment is contractible. Proof of
the non-contractible and non-observable result is available from the authors.
8sunk-cost. The ex ante contract sees negative rent in the ¯rst period and positive rent
in the second period for both types. However, in the absence of a binding commitment,
ex post an optimizing regulator will renege on the promise of positive rent and o®er
a new contract at a lower price just su±cient to satisfy the second-period individual
rationality constraint. Anticipating this opportunistic behaviour, in the absence of
commitment both ¯rms will under-invest in the ¯rst period. We now move to a formal
analysis of the non-commitment case in order to show how the extent, or indeed the
existence, of both these problems can be in°uenced by the choice of regulator.
4 Asymmetric Information without Commitment
4.1 The Delegation Game
Consider a two-period, two-type delegation game with the same structure and informa-
tion assumptions as section 3, but now with the assumption that the regulator cannot
commit to a two-period price contract. The government however can commit to a
particular regulator over this interval.12 Asymmetric information introduces dynamics
through the process of learning about the ¯rm's type. At the beginning of the game
the ¯rm knows its type ¯. The government and all types of regulators have the prior
º1 that ¯ = ¯. Then the sequence of events for the delegation game is given by:
1. The government has preferences as for the regulator, except that rent carries a
weight ®s (re°ecting social welfare), and delegates to an independent regulator of type
® 6= ®s for the two periods. In the absence of delegation, the regulator is government-
dependent and adopts a weight ® = ®s.
2. The regulator o®ers a choice of two ¯rst-period price contracts from which the ¯rm
chooses one or neither. First-period e®ort e1 and investment i are applied by the ¯rm,
the cost C1 is realized and observed by regulator.
3. The regulator updates her prior º1 to º2.
12In common with much of the strategic delegation literature, we do not examine the reasons why
a government may ¯nd it easier to commit to a type of regulator than (say) to a pricing policy: our
intention is to demonstrate the e®ects that such delegation can have on investment and welfare.
94. The regulator o®ers a choice of two second-period contracts from which the ¯rm
chooses one or neither. Second-period e®ort e2 is applied by the ¯rm, the cost C2 is
realized and observed by regulator.
In the ¯rst period, given º1, the regulator designs contracts (p
1;C1) and (p1;C1). In
general we must consider equilibria in which the e±cient ¯rm may mimic the ine±cient
and vice versa. When the e±cient ¯rm chooses the low cost contract it chooses output
q
1 = Á¡1(p
1) and e®ort (e1;i) such that observed cost C1 = ¯ ¡e1 +i+cq
1. Similarly
when the ine±cient ¯rm chooses the high cost contract it chooses output q1 = Á¡1(p1)
and e®ort (e1;i) such that observed cost C1 = ¯¡e1+i+cq1. Denote mimicking e®ort
for the e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms by (~ e1;~ i) and (~ e1;~ i) and ¢¯ ´ ¯ ¡ ¯.13 In order
to realize the appropriate observed costs, these mimicking e®orts must satisfy
~ e1 = e1 ¡ ¢¯ +~ i ¡ i; ~ e1 = e1 +¢ ¯ +~ i ¡ i (8)
Suppose that the e±cient ¯rm chooses the low cost contract with probability x and
the high cost contract with probability 1 ¡ x. Similarly suppose that the ine±cient
¯rm chooses the high cost contract with probability y and the low cost contract with
probability 1 ¡ y. The appropriate equilibrium concept for this game is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) found by backward induction starting at event 4. We
de¯ne the regulator's information sets at this point as follows: H (resp. L)i f( p1;C1)
(resp. (p
1;C1)) was accepted in period 1.
4.2 The Second-Period Contract
At L and H, the regulator designs contracts (p
2;C2), and (p2;C2) for low and high
cost types respectively, given the (updated) probabilities º2(L) and º2(H) that the
¯rm is e±cient. At L we have that ¯
2 = ¯ ¡ f(i) and ¯2 = ¯ ¡ f(~ i). Similarly at H,
¯
2 = ¯ ¡ f(~ i) and ¯2 = ¯ ¡ f(i). Contracts must be designed to satisfy the following
13We adopt the following notation: ~ z is some outcome for the e±cient ¯rm who mimics the ine±cient
¯rm and ~ z is the corresponding outcome for the ine±cient ¯rm who mimics the e±cient ¯rm.
10incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints for each ¯rm:
IC2 : U2 ¸ ~ U2 = U2 +© ( e2)
IC2 : U2 ¸ ~ U2 = U2 ¡ ©(e2 +¢ ¯2)
IR2 : U2 ¸ 0
IR2 : U2 ¸ 0
where ©(e2)=Ã(e2) ¡ Ã(e2 ¡ ¢¯2) and ©(e2 +¢ ¯2)=Ã(e2 +¢ ¯2) ¡ Ã(e2) are the
¯rms' information rents. Because IC2+IR2 ) IR2, we can drop the latter constraint.
It is convenient to formulate the regulator's problem in terms of the choice of output
and e®ort levels bearing in mind that contracts are designed as prices, contingent on
observed total costs. The regulator's problem, to be carried out at each information
set characterized by the state variables given by the vector s =[ º2, ¯
2;¯2], is now:
Given s =[ º2;¯
2;¯2], choose (q2;e2) and (q
2;e 2) to maximize the expected
welfare
E[W2]=­ 2 = º2W(q
2;e 2;¯
2;®)+( 1¡ º2)W(q2;e2;¯2;®) (9)
subject to IC2, IC2 and IR2.
To solve this optimization problem, let ¹2 ¸ 0, ³2 ¸ 0 and »2 ¸ 0 be the La-
grangian multipliers associated with the IC2, IC2 and IR2 constraints respectively.
Then de¯ning the Lagrangian
L2 =­ 2 + ¹2(U2 ¡ U2 ¡ ©(e2)) + ³2(U2 ¡ U2 +© ( e2 +¢ ¯2)) + »2U2







¹2 ¡ ³2 + º2(® ¡ 1)







»2 ¡ ¹2 + ³2 +( 1¡ º2)(® ¡ 1)
(»2 ¡ ¹2 + ³2 +( 1¡ º2)®)´(q2)
(11)
11(º2® + ¹2 ¡ ³2)(1 ¡ Ã
0(e2)) = ¡³2©
0(e2 +¢ ¯2) (12)
((1 ¡ º2)® + »2 ¡ ¹2 + ³2)(1 ¡ Ã
0(e2)) = ¹2©
0(e2) (13)
¹2(U2 ¡ U2 ¡ ©(e2)) = 0 (14)
³2(U2 ¡ U2 +© ( e2 +¢ ¯2)) = 0 (15)
»2U2 = 0 (16)
To characterise the period 2 equilibrium and how it is a®ected by the type of
regulator we need to examine the behaviour of the constraints as ® increases. In
Appendix A we characterize three second period equilibrium categories14, depending
on the value of ® ¸ 1. In particular, there are threshold values ®2 >® 2 > 1 such that:
² ® 2 (1;® 2]: IC2 and IR2 both bind. We call this second-period equilibrium
category b.
² ® 2 (®2;®2]: IR2 binds. We call this second-period equilibrium category c.
² ®>®2: unconstrained. We call this second-period equilibrium category d.
Notice that, in principle, we could have a second-period equilibrium, category a
say, in which all three constraints IC2, IC2 and IR2 bind. A familiar one-period result
for a utilitarian regulator (® = 1) is that IC2 does not bind (see La®ont and Tirole
(1993)) and therefore »2 = 0. Since the e®ect of increasing ® is to relax constraints,
this means that equilibrium category a does not exist in the second period for ®>1
either. Equilibrium category b is then the familiar result for a single-period model. As
® increases (i.e. as the regulator becomes increasingly pro-industry), ¯rst IC2 ceases
to bind (¹2 =0 )a t® = ®2 and then IR2 ceases to bind too (»2 = 0), at ® = ®2.15
14Our equilibrium `categories' are equivalent to the equilibrium `types' in La®ont and Tirole (1993)).
We introduce this new terminology having reserved `type' to describe a regulator of given preference
for rent and a ¯rm of `type ¯'. Note also that although di®erent equilibrium categories exist, for a given
set of parameter values (including ®) our numerical results always converge to the same equilibrium,
regardless of initial values. This strongly suggests that the equilibrium is unique (given parameter
values) and that problems of multiple equilibria do not arise.
15As can be con¯rmed from (13) to (16) this order for relaxing the constraints assumes ´0(q2) · 0
and eRO > ¢¯2. The ¯rst of these implies p
2 < p2 (See Levine and Rickman (2001) for further
details.)
12We thus move from equilibrium category b to c, then d as the regulator becomes more
pro-industry.
The intuition is as follows. Since p2 >p
2 there is no incentive for the ine±cient type
to mimic the e±cient type. Therefore constraint IC2 does not bind. The following
possibilities remain: IC2 and IR2 bind (i.e., equilibrium b), only IC2 binds, only IR2
binds, and no constraints bind. Of these, an equilibrium with only IC2 binding must be
sub-optimal because it implies rent for the ine±cient type which must also be passed on
to the e±cient type. As ® increases, the progression between each equilibrium tells us
that the increasingly generous regulator eventually supplies enough rent to the e±cient
¯rm to remove its incentive to mimic, and then allows the ine±cient ¯rm positive rent.
By setting the appropriate multipliers to zero in (10){(16), and eliminating the rest,
we can determine the nature of the second period contracts o®ered by di®erent types
of regulator; see Appendix A. Thus, regulators of type ® 2 (0;®2] o®er a high-powered
contract to the e±cient ¯rm (Ã0(e2) = 1) and one involving a measure of cost-sharing
for the ine±cient one (Ã0(e2) < 1). More pro-industry regulators (®>®2) o®er high-
powered contracts to both ¯rms and secure Ramsey-optimal e®ort in either case. At
the same time, the fact that more rent is available to both ¯rms as ® increases will
provide investment incentives in period 1. We now turn to this investment decision.
4.3 The First-Period Investment Decision
Our analysis now moves to the ¯rst period where there are two decisions: the ¯rm's
investment decision and the regulator's contract o®ers. Beginning with the former,
consider a ¯rm of either type who has accepted a ¯rst-period contract specifying price
and cost, (p1;C 1), and faces the prospect of a rent U2 = U(q2;e 2;¯ 2) corresponding
to one of the second-period equilibria b;c or d at L or H. From the second-period
optimization we know that (q2;e 2) is a function of the state vector s =[ º2;¯
2;¯2]a t
the relevant information set. Thus we can write U2 = U2(s). Then given (p1;C 1) and
therefore q1 = Á¡1(p1), the ¯rm chooses i to maximize
U1 + ±U2 = p1q1 ¡ C1 ¡ Ã(¯ + i + cq1 ¡ C1)+±U2(¯2(i)) (17)
13The ¯rst-order condition for a local maximum (we consider whether this is also global
below) is
Ã






using ¯2 = ¯ ¡ f(i), from which ¯0
2(i)=¡f0(i). This is the familiar condition that
the marginal cost of investment (MC(e1)=Ã0(e1)) must equal its marginal bene¯t
(MB(i)). It is immediately apparent that the ¯rm's investment decision depends on
its ¯rst-period e®ort and anticipated second-period rent: the former o®sets the e®ects
of i on costs; the latter funds the investment. Accordingly, the regulator can in°uence
investment behaviour through the power of the ¯rst-period contract and the credibility
of o®ers of future rent (i.e., prices). In particular, the position of the MB curve is
determined by the regulator's type since di®erent second-period equilibrium categories
(b, c, d) generate di®erent U2 and, thus, di®erent
@U2
@¯2. Writing the solution to (18) as

































Stated di®erently, the condition in (20) is that MB(i)=¡±
@U2
@¯2f0(i) is decreasing in
i.16 Recalling (5), (18) tells us that the ¯rm's choice of investment is optimal (i = iRO)
when Ã0(e1)= j
@U2
@¯2 j= 1; i.e., the ¯rm must get a one-for-one return on its investment
in period 2. Equation (4) then tells us that optimal investment also requires e = eRO.
Figure 1 illustrates our results; both parts show optimal MB and MC curves, along
with a pair relating to a low-powered contract and a regulator who generates j
@U2
@¯2 j< 1
(so that the ¯rm's rent does not fully bene¯t from its investment). Here, the second-
period prospects for lower rent and the low power of the ¯rst-period contract (which
reduces the marginal cost of investment) work in opposite directions: the former low-
ering and the latter raising investment. Depending on which e®ect dominates we can
16For small changes in ¯
2 and ¯2 we can linearise U2(s) around ¯ and ¯, the second term in this
condition can be ignored and the condition becomes @U2
@¯2 f00(i) > 0. Since f00 < 0 and @U2
@¯2 < 0i s
necessary for any investment, the condition then holds. We are not able to show that the condition
holds more generally, but numerical results indicate that this may be the case.
14have under- or over-investment (Figures 2a and b respectively). Thus the value of
j
@U2
@¯2 j< 1 is crucial for the investment decision and Appendix B provides details of
this expression for the second-period equilibrium categories b, c and d.
As we have stated, (18) de¯nes a local optimum. If the ¯rm chooses to invest at
all it will choose i = i(e1). However the ¯rm may choose not to invest. Given the
anticipated second-period regulated price (which depends on ®), i = i(e1) is preferable
to no investment, i = 0, only if ¡Ã(e1)+±U2(¯2(i)) > ¡Ã(e1 ¡ i)+±U2(¯2(0)); i.e.,
±[U2(¯2(i)) ¡ U2(¯2(0))] >Ã (e1) ¡ Ã(e1 ¡ i) (21)
This investment condition states that the second-period price must be su±cient for
the future gain in rent to outweigh the current marginal cost of investing. Notice that
if, in the second period, the constraint IR2 binds then U2(¯2(i)) = U2(¯2(0) = 0 and
(21) cannot hold for i>0. Only when the regulator's type is su±ciently pro-rent that
®>®2 and we have a second-period equilibrium category d, can this condition hold
for both the e±cient and ine±cient ¯rm. However, the e±cient ¯rm may optimally
invest, or over-invest, in second-period equilibrium categories b, c and d because of
the existence of information rent. We summarize our results on the ¯rm's investment
decision in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (The ¯rm's investment decision). There is an investment-e®ort
trade-o® in the ¯rst period and more investment can only be secured at the expense
of lower e®ort (i.e., a lower power contract) in the ¯rst period, provided (21) and the
condition in (20) are satis¯ed. Over-investment or under-investment can occur.
It is interesting that, in principle, the regulator's commitment problem can generate
over-investment as well as under-investment. We now examine the regulator's ¯rst-
period contract o®er and con¯rm that both forms of investment behaviour can arise in
equilibrium. We also examine how the type of regulator may achieve Ramsey-optimal
investment.
15Figure 1: Determinants of under/over-investment
4.4 First-Period Contract
Now consider the design of contracts (p
1;C1) and (p1;C1), given º1. Since the e±cient
¯rm may mimic the ine±cient ¯rm with probability 1 ¡ x, and the ine±cient may
mimic the e±cient ¯rm with probability 1¡y, the probabilities of arriving at L and H
are Pr(L)=º1x +( 1¡ º1)(1 ¡ y) and Pr(H)=º1(1 ¡ x)+( 1¡ º1)y. Then by Bayes'
Rule we have






(º1x +( 1¡ º1)(1 ¡ y))
(22)






(º1(1 ¡ x)+( 1¡ º1)y)
(23)
It is convenient to formulate the regulator's problem in terms of the choice of
output and e®ort levels and the probabilities x and y. With E[W2] = Pr(L)E[W2 j
L] + Pr(H)E[W2 j H], the ¯rst-period optimization problem for the regulator of type
® is:
16Given º1, choose x;y, (q1;e1) and (q
1;e 1) to maximize
­=E[W1 + ±W2]=º1[xW(q
1;e 1;¯+ i(e1);®)+( 1¡ x)W(q1;~ e1;¯+ i(~ e1);®)]
+( 1 ¡ º1)[yW(q1;e1;¯ + i(e1);®)+( 1¡ y)W(q
1;~ e1;¯ + i(~ e1);®)]
+ ±E[W2] (24)
subject to IC1, IC1, IR1 and IR1.
Let the rent obtained when each ¯rm mimics the other be given by
~ U1 = U1 + Ã(e1) ¡ Ã(~ e1); ~ U1 = U1 + Ã(e1) ¡ Ã(~ e1) (25)
where from (8) and (18) we have that ~ e1 = e1 ¡¢¯ +i(~ e1)¡i(e1) and ~ e1 = e1 +¢¯ +
i(~ e1) ¡ i(e1). Hence ~ e1 =~ e1(e1) and ~ e1 = ~ e1(e1) and (25) can be written
~ U1 = U1 +£ ( e1); ~ U1 = U1 ¡ ¡(e1)
Also, let s(L) and s(H) denote the state vectors at L and H respectively. Then the
¯rst-period incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are given by:
IC1 : U1 + ±U2(s(L)) ¸ ~ U1 + ±U2(s(H))
IC1 : U1 + ±U2(s(H)) ¸ ~ U1 + ±U2(s(L))
IR1 : U1 + ±U2(s(L)) ¸ 0
IR1 : U1 + ±U2(s(H)) ¸ 0
Once again, it is clear that IC1 + IR1 ) IR1 so that we can ignore the latter. Also,
since U2 = 0 in second-period equilibrium b and c, and U2 is independent of L and
H in equilibrium d, we must have that U2(s(H)) = U2(s(L)). The IC1 constraint
therefore simpli¯es to U1 ¸ ~ U1.
As before, to solve this optimization problem, we let ¹1 ¸ 0, ³1 ¸ 0 and »1 ¸ 0b e
the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the IC1, IC1 and IR1 constraints respec-
17tively. Then the Lagrangian and ¯rst-order conditions are given by:







¹1 ¡ ³1 +( º1x +( 1¡ º1)(1 ¡ y))(® ¡ 1)







»1 ¡ ¹1 + ³1 +( º1(1 ¡ x)+( 1¡ º1)y)(® ¡ 1)
[»1 ¡ ¹1 + ³1 +( º1(1 ¡ x)+( 1¡ º1)y))®]´(q1)
(27)
(®º1x + ¹1 ¡ ³1)(1 ¡ Ã
0(e1)) + ³1¡
0(e1)
¡ [®º1x(1 ¡ ±f
0(i)) + ¹1(1 ¡ Ã
0(e1)) ¡ ³1]i
0(e1)




1(e1) = 0 (28)
(®(1 ¡ º1)y + »1 ¡ ¹1 + ³1)(1 ¡ Ã
0(e1)) ¡ ¹1£
0(e1)
¡ [®(1 ¡ º1)y(1 ¡ ±f
0(i)) + »1(1 ¡ Ã
0(e1)) ¡ ¹1 + ³1]i
0(e1))
¡ [®º1(1 ¡ x)(1 ¡ ±f




1(e1) = 0 (29)
¹1(U1 ¡ ~ U1 ¡ ±(U2(s(H)) ¡ U2(s(L))) = 0 (30)
³1(U1 ¡ ~ U1) = 0 (31)
»1(U1 + ±U2(s(H))) = 0 (32)
In period 1, unlike period 2 the IC1 constraint can bind. The reason for this is
the ratchet e®ect: the higher rent required by the e±cient type to prevent it from
mimicking and thus enjoying information rent in the second period is also attractive
to the ine±cient ¯rm. The ratchet e®ect increases with the discount factor ± (and
disappears as ± ! 0 where the set-up in e®ect is static). As the weight ® increases
in period 2, second-period equilibrium categories c then d emerge, o®ering the ¯-¯rm
second-period rent even when it reveals its type in period 1. This in turn reduces the
ratchet e®ect and constraints IC1;IC1 and IR1 cease to bind in that order giving four
18¯rst-period equilibrium categories: `category a' where all bind, `category b' where IC1
and IR1 bind, `category c' where only IR1 binds and `category d' the unconstrained
case. The intuition is the same as that set out for the second period.
4.5 The Two-Period Equilibrium
Taking the second and ¯rst-period contracts together, we now have a number of pos-
sible outcomes, depending on the cost and demand conditions and, in particular, the
type of regulator (®). Each con¯guration of parameters determines which IC and IR
constraints bind in each period. Table 1 sets out the possibilities. Each row describes a
particular combination of ¯rst-period constraints. The columns describe second-period
constraints and depend on whether a low cost (L) or high cost (H) ¯rst-period contract
has been observed.17 The delegation decision on the type of regulator, captured by ®,
is particularly crucial for determining which equilibrium category applies. As with the
second-period contract, each of these outcomes can be characterised by setting the
relevant multipliers to zero in (26){(31) and solving the resulting simpli¯ed ¯rst-order
conditions: see Appendix B.
IC2L;IR2L IR2L None IC2H;IR2H IR2H None
IC1;IC1;IR1 (a;bL) (a;cL) (a;dL) (a;bH) (a;cH) (a;dH)
IC1;IR1 (b;bL) (b;cL) (b;dL) (b;bH) (b;cH) (b;dH)
IR1 (c;bL) (c;cL) (c;dL) (c;bH) (c;cH) (c;dH)
None (d;bL) (d;cL) (d;dL) (d;bH) (d;cH) (d;dH)
Table 1. The Two-Period Equilibrium
In fact we can rule out some of the outcomes in Table 1. The ratchet e®ect means
that ¯rst-period constraints IC1 and IC1 must bind before their second-period coun-
terparts. Similarly IR1 must bind before IR2; otherwise the contracts o®er rent to the
ine±cient type in the ¯rst period, but not the second; yet the only reasons for o®ering
17La®ont and Tirole (1993), chapter 9, derive a non-commitment PBE equilibrium for a procurement
problem where contracts are transfers conditional on cost, there is no delegation (® = ®s = 1), and no
investment. What they call types III and I equilibria correspond to our equilibrium categories (a;b)
and (b;b) respectively.
19the ine±cient type rent would be a pro-industry regulator who su±ciently likes rent,
in which case she would o®er it in both periods (equilibrium (d;d)), or a regulator who
wishes to encourage investment, in which case rent is o®ered in the second-period only.
These considerations imply that as ® increases above unity, second-period constraints
cease before their ¯rst-period counterparts, ruling out the lower-diagonal equilibrium
categories (c;bL);(d;bL), (d;cL) and (c;bH);(d;bH), (d;cH).
Table 1 provides the main insights into the e®ects of selecting a particular type
of regulator; once the government has selected ®, the category of equilibrium follows
immediately. It is clear that only equilibrium categories (¤;d) can generate investment
by the ine±cient ¯rm since U2 > 0 only when IR2 slackens. Similarly, as we move
from (b;¤)t o( c;¤), increasingly credible promises of future rent gradually overcome
the ratchet e®ect (IC ceases to bind) and e1 and e1 can both equal eRO (see Appendix
B)|a necessary condition for i = iRO. Of course, because removing the ratchet e®ect
reduces rents, prices can fall when this happens.
Focusing more closely on investment behaviour, and ¯rst period e®ort consider
Figures 2 and 3. These provide a numerical example of how investment and ¯rst
period e®ort respectively are a®ected by the choice of regulator and can be explained
using Table 1.18Note that Figure 3 excludes e1 (= eRO = 1) for simplicity. For our
choices of functional forms and parameter values (a;¤) equilibrium categories do not
occur, but if they did we ¯nd in Appendix C the possibility of all e®orts and investment
being greater or less than the Ramsey optimum. 19
To begin with, the chosen regulator is of the type to produce equilibrium category
(b;b). Using Appendices B and C and Figure 2, we can characterise investment for this
category as follows. First, since IR2 binds, i = 0. Next, suppose the e±cient ¯rm does
18We choose functional forms: Ã(e)=
°
2(max(0;e))2, q = Á(p)=Ap¡´ ;´>1 and f(i)=Biµ; µ 2
(0;1), and parameters: ¯ =2 ,¯ =2 :5, c = ° = B =1 ,A = 10, ´ =1 :5, º1 = µ =0 :5, ± =0 :9 and
® = ®s = 1 (no delegation). With these choices we have eRO =1 =° = 1 and iRO =( ±µB)
1
1¡µ =0 :2025
19For the (b;¤) type equilibrium categories, which do occur, the optimal incentive mechanism is
found by maximizing the social welfare function over x 2 [0;1], where, we recall, x is the probability
that the e±cient ¯rm mimics the ine±cient ¯rm in period 1. However here we avoid the complications
arising from x changing with every parameter combination and present results for an exogenously
chosen x =0 :5. Thus, we actually underestimate the welfare gains from delegation reported in section
5. All numerical results are obtained using programs written in MATLAB. These are available to the
reader on request.
20Figure 2: Delegation and Investment
not mimic the ine±cient one (i.e. (b;bL)). From Appendix B, e1 = eRO (since IC1
does not bind); from Appendix B, we have j
@U2
@¯2 j< 1 and therefore from (18) MB(i)
= ± j
@U2
@¯2 j f0(i) <± f 0(i). Referring back to Figure 1, we thus have 0 <i<i RO|
assuming (21) holds (otherwise i = 0). Thus, under-investment or, as in Figure 3,
no investment occurs. Now suppose that the e±cient ¯rm mimics (i.e. (b;bH)). We
now have ~ e1 <e RO (See Figure 3 and Appendix C) along with MB(i) <± f 0(i). From
Figure 1 (and assuming (21) holds) the lower marginal cost and marginal bene¯t of
investment lead to ~ i T iRO; in our example the net e®ect is under-investment.
Selecting a more pro-industry regulator (higher ®) moves us through the various
(b;¤) equilibrium categories and at around ® =1 :32 the regulator is of the type to
generate equilibrium category (b;c) and then, as ® increases, (b;d). When the latter
is reached, we know that both the e±cient and ine±cient ¯rm may now invest since
IR2 slackens, and indeed, the ine±cient ¯rm can over-invest if e1 <e RO. However the
investment condition (21) must also be satis¯ed. Since the ine±cient ¯rm receives no
information rent in the second period this condition is only satis¯ed at higher values
of ® than for the e±cient ¯rm. In Figure 2 this does not happen and in equilibrium
categories (b;c) and (b;d) the ine±cient ¯rm does not invest at all.
21Figure 3: Delegation and ¯rst-period e®ort
For the e±cient ¯rm, when (b;c) is reached, non-mimicking investment is Ramsey-
optimal as can be con¯rmed from Appendix C (no mimicking so e1 = eRO) and Ap-
pendix B (MB(i)=¡1). However its mimicking investment involves over-investment;
see Figure 2 . This is because its marginal cost of investment is low (~ e1 <e RO) while
its MB(i) is optimal. Thus, as noted in Proposition 2, we have the interesting prospect
of the regulator's commitment problem creating over-investment.
Still more pro-industry regulators move us towards the bottom righthand corner of
the table (through (c;¤) equilibrium categories for ® 2 [1:45;1:47]), then (d;¤), as IC1,
and IR1 cease to bind in turn. Now e1 = e1 = eRO and Ramsey-optimal investment by
both e±cient and ine±cient ¯rms can take place if the investment condition (21) holds,
as is the case in Figure 2. Then the marginal cost of investment is Ramsey-optimal
and the regulator is su±ciently pro-industry that the marginal bene¯t of investment is
similarly optimal (Appendices B and C).
It is also possible to con¯rm (see Levine and Rickman (2001)) that as the (b;d)
equilibrium category is entered, the regulator is o®ering su±cient second-period rent
to prevent the ratchet e®ect from taking place. Thus, at this point, regulated prices fall
as they no longer take account of the extra information rent required by the e±cient
¯rm.
22Working through Table 1 in the above fashion gives us:
Lemma 1. Any positive investment requires (21) to hold, otherwise investment is zero.
Then the equilibrium categories exhibit the following ¯rst-period e®ort and investment
behaviour:
(a;b);(a;c): ~ i;iT iRO;i =0




e1;~ e1;e1;~ e1 T e
RO
(b;b): ~ i T iRO;i<i RO;i =0
(b;c): ~ i >i RO;i= iRO;i =0
(b;d):~ i; i>i RO;i = iRO
9
> > > =
> > > ;
e1 = e
RO ; e1; ~ e1 <e
RO
(c;c): i = iRO;i =0




e1 = e1 = e
RO
Bringing Lemma 1 together with the e®ect of ® on the constraints yields the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 3 (Delegation and investment). Unlike relatively utilitarian regula-
tors, relatively pro-industry ones are able to guarantee Ramsey-optimal investment (if
su±ciently pro-industry, by both ¯rms). A necessary condition for Ramsey-optimal
investment is ®>®2 where ®2 is the regulator's weight on rent at which all second
period IC and IR constraints cease to bind. The su±cient condition is that ® must rise
further to insure Ramsey-optimal investment is preferable to no investment and (21)
is satis¯ed.
5 Delegation and Welfare
We have seen that delegation to a pro-industry regulator with a carefully chosen prefer-
ence parameter ® can increase investment, reduce the ratchet e®ect and result in both
lower prices, bene¯ting consumers, and higher rent: it can, in other words, be Pareto
improving . This section investigates these welfare gains further, compares them with
the welfare gain from full commitment and examines the scope for a wrong choice of
23® that leads to counterproductive delegation. First consider the single-period social
welfare (3):
Wt = S(pt) ¡ R(pt)+®sUt = W(pt;U t;® s)
Then having obtained prices and rents in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a regu-
lator of type ®, we can write the two-period social welfare as
­(®;®s)=º1[xW(p
1(®);U1(®);® s)+( 1¡ x)W(p1(®); ~ U1(®);® s)]
+( 1 ¡ º1)[yW(p1(®);U1(®);® s)+( 1¡ y)W(p
1(®); ~ U1(®);® s)] + E[W2(®;®s)]
where
E[W2(®;®s)] = (º1x +( 1¡ º1)(1 ¡ y))E[W2jL)+( º1(1 ¡ x)+( 1¡ º1)y)E[W2jH]
E[W2jL]=º2LW(p
2L(®);U2L(®);® s)+( 1¡ º2L)W(p2L(®);U2L(®);® s)
E[W2jH]=º2HW(p
2H(®);U2H(®);® s)+( 1¡ º2H)W(p2H(®);U2H(®);® s)
We measure the welfare gain from delegation, G(®) as follows. Let ­C be the
optimal two-period social welfare under commitment. Then
G(®)=
­(®;®s) ¡ ­(®s;® s)
­C ¡ ­(®s;® s)
£ 100
Thus G(®) · 100% and measures the extent to which delegation can substitute for full
commitment.
Figure 4 plots G(®) against ® for B = f0;1;1:5g. The case of B = 0 shows the
ability of delegation to mitigate the ratchet e®ect on its own, without investment con-
siderations. These results demonstrate the possibility of signi¯cant welfare gains from
delegation with the appropriate choice of ®.20 However without investment consider-
ations a regulator who is only slightly too pro-industry leads to a welfare loss: the
negative welfare e®ects of increasing rent (i.e., prices) cut in quickly. Delegation is far
20It is clear from our numerical example that, given our choice of parameter values, there exists an
`optimal ®'. It would be desirable to produce an analytical existence result, but this is precluded by the
complexities of the set-up that includes two-period dynamics, moral hazard and adverse selection|all
essential ingredients in the regulation game with investment.
24Figure 4: Welfare gains from delegation
more robust (and the range of `bene¯cial' regulators is considerably wider) if investment
is introduced, especially if its impact on costs is at the higher level of B =1 :5.
Proposition 4 (Delegation and Welfare). Numerical Results show that welfare can
be increased by delegation to a range of pro-industry regulators. As investment becomes
more e®ective, a wider range of regulators achieves this result.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
The question of how to encourage investment by regulated industries is a central one
for regulators. Problems arise because despite the bene¯ts of investment (lower costs),
regulators ex post have an incentive to lower prices, which ¯rms anticipate. A number
of authors have identi¯ed the resulting `under-investment' in a variety of regulatory set-
tings. The present paper considers a dynamic non-commitment problem and makes sev-
eral contributions to the analysis of the under-investment problem. First, we show how
strategic delegation to a suitable type of regulator can overcome the under-investment
problem (as well as the ratchet e®ect that also arises in the model). Second, we fo-
cus on non-contractible investment in the presence of asymmetric information about
other cost-reducing e®ort by the ¯rm. Third, the regulator is not permitted to use
25transfers in order to reimburse the ¯rm. The full set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria is
characterised. We suggest that each of these contributions accords with features of the
regulatory environment, for example in the UK.
Our results throw some light on how a regulatory regime might achieve e®ective
regulation. This must achieve: (i) the freedom to respond to the latest information
regarding the industry; i.e., it must involve discretion; (ii) socially optimal investment
and e®ort, ruling out direct controls or `rate-of-return' regulation and (iii) consumer
bene¯ts from higher investment through lower prices. Our paper shows that, with
discretion, delegation of price regulation to an independent regulator of the appropriate
type will achieve these objectives.
This, in a sense, is a positive rather than normative result. If we observe good
regulation it could be coming about through this mechanism. To derive normative
conclusions we note that, in common with much of the strategic delegation literature,
we have relocated the problem as one of choosing the correct ®, but we have not
addressed directly how an appropriate regulator can be found. While it is reasonable
to suppose that track records can play a valuable role here, it may still be sensible to
consider safeguards against `mistakes'. In this respect, Spulber and Besanko (1992)'s
suggestion that legal rules can be helpful for implementing simple (but clear) policy
objectives is relevant. Thus, one could imagine statutory limits on the maximum
prices that regulators could set, so as to curtail excessively pro-industry behaviour.
Furthermore new regulators without a clear track-record should be aware of the problem
posed in our model and be prepared to build up a reputation for achieving the `right
balance between the needs of consumers and the ¯rm' (i.e., a reputation for having the
right ®). Formal modelling of this process would be worthwhile in future work.
Our analysis makes predictions about the e®ects of regulatory independence on in-
vestment, costs and prices (see also Currie et al. (1999)). An important requirement for
testing these predictions would be a suitable index of regulatory independence in var-
ious countries/industries in order to compare di®erent regulatory regimes. Naturally,
such an index would be complex to produce. However, to the extent that regulatory in-
dependence can be shown to have bene¯ts in theory, such empirical work would provide
important insights for policy makers in this area.
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A Details of Second-Period Equilibrium Categories
Second-Period Equilibrium b: ® 2 [1;® 2]. Only IC2 and IR2 constraints bind.
Putting ³2 = 0 and eliminating ¹2 and »2 the ¯rst order conditions (foc) for this
equilibrium gives the following four equations in q
2;q2;e 2 and e2:
U2 = U(q
2;e 2;¯
2)=© ( e2) (A.1)
U2 = U(q2;e2;¯2)=0
Ã


























U2 = U(q2;e2;¯2) = 0 (A.4)
Ã
0(e2)=Ã
0(e2) = 1; i.e.,e2 = e2 = e
RO (A.5)
U2 > U2 +© ( e2) (A.6)



















U2 > 0 (A.9)
Ã
0(e2)=Ã
0(e2) = 1; i.e.,e2 = e2 = e
RO (A.10)
U2 > U2 +© ( e2) (A.11)
B Details of The Investment Decision
Di®erentiating the foc in Appendix A we can evaluate the derivatives j
@U2
@¯2 j:












@¯2 = 0. To prove this result, ¯rst note that the second-period information rent
©=Ã(e2) ¡ Ã(~ e2) is a function of e2 and ¢¯2, the latter depending on investment in






































































a0+a1(1 ¡ Ã0(~ e2)) < (1 ¡ Ã0(~ e2)), which proves the result.





· 0) for the e±cient ¯rm, but i =~ i = 0 for the ine±cient ¯rm. For second-period
equilibrium categories c and d it is straightforward to obtain the following results:






@¯2 = 0. Hence, as before
if (21) holds, i ¸ 0, and mimicking investment~ i ¸ 0 for the e±cient ¯rm, but i =~ i =0
for the ine±cient ¯rm.






@¯2 = ¡1. Now, as a result of
the extra rent o®ered by a regulator of type ®>®2, i, i, ~ i and ~ i can all be positive.
C Details of First Period Equilibrium Categories
Let us now consider each row of this table in turn:
Equilibria (a;¤): IC1;IC1;IR1 bind (³1;¹ 1;» 1 > 0).
Then given x and y, q
1;q1, e1, and e1, are given by (26), (27), (28), (29), (30) and
(31), given the functions i = i(e1) and i0(e1) obtained in section 4.3. This system
of equations allows the possibility of all e®orts being greater or less than the Ramsey
optimum. The optimal mechanism for a regulator of type ® is then found by maximizing
the intertemporal utility (24) with respect to x and y.
Equilibria (b;¤): IC1;IR1 bind (³1 =0 ;¹1;» 1 > 0).
The ine±cient ¯rm now does not mimic, so the solution is found by putting y =1 ,
solving (26), (27), (28), (29), (30) and (32), for ¹1;» 1 > 0, q
1;q1, e1, and e1, for a given
x, and then maximizing (24) with respect to x. Now we have that e1 = eRO.
Equilibria (c;¤): IR1 binds (³1 = ¹1 =0 ;»1 > 0).
There is now no mimicking by either type of ¯rm and it is now easy to characterize
the equilibrium. Putting x = y = 1, information sets L and H become singletons and











U(q1;e1;¯1)+±U2 = 0 (C.2)
e1 = e1 = e
RO (C.3)
31Equilibria (d;¤): Unconstrained. (³1 = ¹1 = »1 =0 )
This is the simplest case to characterise. Equations (C.1) and (C.3) apply as before
and (C.2) now becomes
L1 =
p1 ¡ c
p1
=
® ¡ 1
®´(q1)
(C.4)
32